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Abstract
The optimal allocation of a public health care budget across treat-
ments must take account of the way in which care is rationed within
treatments since this will a⁄ect their marginal value. We investigate
the optimal allocation rules for health care systems where user charges
are ￿xed and care is rationed by waiting. The optimal waiting time
is higher for treatments with demands more elastic to waiting time,
higher costs, lower charges, smaller marginal welfare loss from waiting
by treated patients, and smaller marginal welfare losses from under-
consumption of care. The results hold for a wide range of welfarist
and non-welfarist objective functions and for systems in which there
is also a private health care sector. They imply that allocation rules
based purely on cost e⁄ectiveness ratios are suboptimal because they
assume that there is no rationing within treatments.
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11 Introduction
We investigate how a ￿xed health care budget should be allocated across
treatments when patient charges are ￿xed and care is rationed by waiting.1
Since an increase in the supply of a treatment reduces the time patients wait
for it, optimal allocation of the budget across treatments is equivalent to
determining the optimal waiting times for the di⁄erent treatments.
Waiting times for elective surgery are used as a rationing mechanism
in many countries with tax or public health insurance ￿nance. Examples
include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and
the United Kingdom. Average waiting times for procedures, such as hip and
knee replacement, cataract surgery, and varicose veins, of six months are not
uncommon (Siciliani and Hurst, 2004). There is considerable variation in
waiting times across treatment. Some examples from England in 2003/4 are
125 days for cataracts; 65 days for mouth or throat procedures category 2;
77 days for percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty; and 223 days
for primary hip replacement.
The literature on the optimal allocation of the health care budget across
treatments considers the mix of treatments which will maximise total health
gain (Garber, 2000). It suggests that resources should be allocated to di⁄er-
ent treatments according to their cost e⁄ectiveness ratios (CERs): the ratio
of cost to health bene￿t. The literature assumes that there is an exoge-
nously determined number of patients for each treatment, all of whom have
the same health gain from the treatment. Treatments are ranked by their
CERs and treatments with the lowest CER are funded until the budget is ex-
hausted. The CER allocation rule implies that there is no wait for treatment
for funded treatments and an in￿nite wait for the unfunded.
The key assumption underlying the CER allocation rule is that marginal
health bene￿t from a treatment is constant. But it is di¢ cult to reconcile this
assumption with two types of evidence. First, sub-group analyses in trials
show that bene￿t typically varies across sub-groups receiving a treatment
(Douglas, Buxton and O￿ Brien, 2003). Second, if all patients had the same
gains from treatment, demand curves for health care would be horizontal up
to the number of patients. But utilisation studies show that demand curves
are negatively sloped with respect to time and money prices (Martin and
Smith, 1999; Martin et al., 2007; Newhouse et al, 1993; Ringel et al, 2002).
Given the di⁄erences in health bene￿t for patients receiving a treatment,
the assumption of constant marginal bene￿t is equivalent to implicitly as-
1Gravelle and Siciliani (2007) consider the optimal choice of patient charges and waiting
times. They show that under plausible assumptions about patient preferences the optimal
waiting time is zero if the welfare function is utilitarian.
2suming that patients are drawn at random from those who could bene￿t.
But there are almost no examples of random rationing in public health care
systems. Publicly funded health care is generally rationed by money or wait-
ing time prices. Such rationing implies that treated patients have a higher
perceived bene￿t than those not treated and that the health gain of the mar-
ginal patient falls as supply is increased and the money or waiting time price
is reduced. Thus CER based rules for allocating budgets across treatments
rest on an incorrect speci￿cation of the way the supply of a given treatment
is rationed. Even if one accepts the value judgements underlying them, CER
based allocation rules require modi￿cation because the rationing mechanism
within treatments a⁄ects the marginal value of treatments.
Only one paper on priority setting across treatments has taken account
of the way in which patients are rationed within treatments.2 Smith (2005)
considers a health care system which is ￿nanced by a mixture of an exogenous
budget and user charge revenue. The volumes of di⁄erent treatments are
determined by the patient demands at the user charges set by the health
planner. It is assumed that all patients have same health bene￿t from a given
treatment but, because patients have di⁄erent incomes and utility of income
is concave, increases in the user charge reduce demand by discouraging poorer
potential patients. The optimal prices which maximise total health gain
are determined by the exogenous CERs and by the money price elasticity
of demands. Treatments with a high CER are not provided, those with
a low CER are provided at no charge, and those with intermediate CERs
are provided at a below cost price. In contrast to the usual Ramsey public
sector pricing rules (Ramsey, 1927), charges are higher (and the volume of
treatment smaller) the more elastic is demand with respect to the charge.
The result is similar to that derived by Besley (1988) for optimal health
insurance contracts. In the usual Ramsey case prices are set to raise a given
sum in revenue and so must exceed marginal cost. In the case of health care,
either because of risk aversion (Besley, 1988) or because of an extra welfarist
2Hoel (2007) shows that the simple CER based allocation rules require modi￿cation
when some patients will buy the treatment in the private sector if it is not provided in the
public sector. Consequently not all treatments provided in the public sector have lower
CERs than those not provided. For example, a treatment for which there is a private sector
alternative may not be provided in the public sector even though it has a lower CER than
a treatment which is provided but for which there is no private sector alternative. The
intuition is that when a private sector alternative is available the gain from public provision
is the cost saving to the patients who would have bought it in the private sector. This cost
saving is less than the utility gain from treatment compared with no treatment. Thus the
average welfare gain from a treatment is lower if it has a private sector alternative. Hoel
(2007) does however assume that if a treatment is provided it is provided to all patients.
Hence he does not need to consider how care is actually rationed within treatments.
3desire to increase consumption of health care (Smith, 2005), the aim is to
spend a ￿xed sum and so prices are less than marginal cost. But, whether the
constraint is to raise a given revenue or to spend a given budget, there is less
welfare loss in departing from marginal cost prices the less elastic is demand.
In the standard Ramsey revenue raising case, prices are raised further above
marginal cost for goods with less elastic demands. In the budget spending
case of health care, prices are lowered further below marginal cost the less
elastic is demand. Hence prices (or coinsurance rates) are higher for goods
with more elastic demands.
In this paper we examine allocation across treatments for a heath care
system where, in contrast to Smith (2005), waiting time rather than money
price rations demand. We also allow for the possibility that patient health
bene￿t from a treatment varies across patients and we consider a more general
welfare function which includes health gain maximisation as a special case.
Unlike a money price, a waiting time price imposes a pure deadweight
loss: it is a cost to patients which is not o⁄set by any gain to the providers.
Longer waiting times reduce the value of treatment because of lost expected
bene￿t, temporary discomfort and pain, and, for some pathologies, the higher
risk of permanent reductions in health (see Hoel and Saether (2003) for some
detailed examples of the cost of waiting).
The change in waiting time costs incurred by patients when supply of a
treatment is reduced is determined by the increase in the wait and the reduc-
tion in the number of patients who wait. The reduction in the number waiting
is equal to the reduction in the supply of treatment. A given reduction in
the supply of treatment will generate a smaller increase in the waiting time
the more elastic the demand with respect to waiting time. Thus the more
elastic the demand with respect to waiting time, the smaller the increase in
waiting time costs when supply is reduced and the waiting time increased.
Hence, when there is rationing by waiting within treatments, the optimal al-
location of resources across treatments should result in longer waiting times
for treatments where demand is more elastic with respect to waiting time.
Waiting times should also be longer for treatments where treated patients
su⁄er less from increased waiting times.
The above argument holds whether or not the welfare function is pater-
nalistic. If the welfare function does not respect individual choices between
treatment and no treatment there is a further factor in￿ uencing the wait-
ing time: the welfare loss associated with indi⁄erent patients displaced as
waiting time increases. With a paternalistic welfare function patients may
place too low a value on treatment relative to no treatment, so that there is a
welfare loss associated with the marginal patient￿ s decision not to be treated.
We show that waiting times should be lower, ceteris paribus, for treatments
4where there is a larger welfare loss for the marginal patient.
Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 derives and discusses the main
results for allocation rules between treatments. Section 4 extends the analysis
by allowing patients to opt for a private sector and shows that the existance
of a private sector makes no essential di⁄erence to the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model speci￿cation
2.1 Preferences, demand, and waiting times
All health care is produced in the public health care system. Demand for
treatment is rationed by waiting. To reduce notational clutter we assume
there are no user charges. We show in section 3.3 that allowing for positive
￿xed user charges makes no essential di⁄erence to the results.
Individuals have the same preferences but di⁄er ex ante in having di⁄erent
incomes y 2 [ymin;ymax] and ex post in having di⁄erent health. Allowing for
di⁄erence in preferences merely complicates analysis and does not alter the
results. With probability ￿i individuals are ill with condition i and will
bene￿t from treatment i. No individual has more than one condition. If ill
with condition i and not treated an individual has utility vNT
i (y), vNT
iy > 0.3
Treated patients have a wait of wi before receiving one unit of treatment
which produces a bene￿t (health gain) b 2 [bmin
i ;bmax
i ]. Utility if treated is
vT
i (y;b;wi), which is increasing in income and health gain and decreasing in
the wait: vT
iy > 0, vT
ib > 0, vT
iw < 0.4
Health bene￿t and income for patients with condition i is distributed
with density fi(b;y) and distribution function Fi(b;y).The marginal distrib-
ution function for income is Fy(y). The total population is normalised to 1.
The planner knows the distribution functions but cannot prioritise individual
patients on the basis of their health gain or their income.
3The formulation allows for the possibility that receiving treatment can increase income.
Let y be income if treated, assume condition i reduces income if not treated by Li(y), and
denote utility if not treated as ^ vNT
i (y￿Li(y)). Then we can write vNT
i (y) = ^ vNT
i (y￿Li(y)).
4We assume that waiting times vary across treatments but are constant within treat-
ments. Gravelle and Siciliani (2006) analyse the e⁄ect of waiting-time prioritisation within
a treatment when bene￿t is partially observable through a continous variable (like age).
They ￿nd that prioritisation within treatments can increase welfare but has ambiguous
e⁄ects on the marginal value of treatment. Thus its e⁄ect on allocations across treatments
is also ambiguous.
5The key assumption is that increases in waiting time reduce the util-
ity from treatment compared with the no treatment alternative. The most
salient form of rationing by waiting time is rationing by waiting list for elec-
tive care. Individuals bear a cost in getting on the waiting list for treatment.
In systems with gatekeeping general practitioners, patients ￿rst have to con-
sult their general practitioner to get a referral and then incur further costs
in attending hospital outpatient department to be seen by a specialist who
will then place them on a waiting list. The longer the time potential pa-
tients know they will have to wait on the list, the less the discounted value
of the treatment and the less likely are they to be willing to incur the initial
costs of joining the list (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith,
1999; Farnworth, 2003). In some systems there is rationing by waiting in line
(queues). Waiting for treatment has an opportunity cost of forgone work or
leisure time, as well as possible e⁄ects on the health gain. Rationing by wait-
ing line can be used for minor ailments in hospital accident and emergency
rooms and for general practitioner consultations. Our speci￿cation encom-
passes both rationing by waiting list and by waiting line and does not restrict
the way in which longer waits reduce the utility of treatment relative to no
treatment (Hoel and Saether, 2003).5 The empirical evidence shows that in-
creases in waiting time reduce demand for health care (Gravelle, Smith and
Xavier, 2003; Martin and Smith, 1999; Martin et al, 2007).
An individual with illness i demands treatment i if and only if
v
T
i (y;b;wi) ￿ v
NT
i (y) ￿ 0 () b ￿ ^ bi(wi;y) (1)
where ^ bi(wi;y) is the threshold bene￿t level such that all those with a smaller
bene￿t do not seek treatment i. The threshold is increasing in the waiting
time since ^ biw(wi;y) = ￿vT
iw=vT
ib > 0.
The e⁄ect of income on the bene￿t threshold is







which may negative or positive depending on the e⁄ect of illness and treat-
ment on the marginal utility of income.6 If income is additively separable
5Our speci￿cation includes the original Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) formulation of
the model of rationing by waiting if we write vT
i = vi (y) +be￿rw ￿ai and vNT
i = vi(y),
where ai is the cost of getting on the list.
6Empirical studies suggest that, controlling for a wide range of morbidity and other
socio-economic characteristics, income has little impact on the number of GP visits but is
positively associated with specialist visits and hospital stays (van Doorslaer et al, 2004;
Morris et al, 2005).
6from health and waiting time, the income sub-utility function is una⁄ected
by treatment, ill health has the same e⁄ect on the income of the treated and
untreated, then (2) is zero and those on higher incomes demand care as much
as individuals with low income.








^ biw(wi;y)fi(^ bi(wi;y);y)dy < 0 (4)
where Di is the per capita demand for treatment i from individuals with
illness i. The supply of treatment i is zi. The waiting time for treatment i
is determined by the market clearing condition
￿iDi(wi) ￿ zi ￿ 0; wi ￿ 0; wi[￿iDi(wi) ￿ zi] = 0 (5)
The equilibrium waiting time, when positive, is determined by (5) as
wi = wi(zi;￿i); wiz = 1=(￿iDiw) < 0 (6)
Resource allocation decisions result in three categories of treatment. Some
treatments are not provided by the health service, which is equivalent to
setting a su¢ ciently high waiting time (wi ￿ wo
i, ￿iDi(wo
i) = 0) to drive
demand to zero. Treatments which are provided are either emergencies,
where the level of supply is such that there is no waiting time (￿iDi(0)
= zi > 0), or electives, where there is a positive wait (wi > 0, ￿iDi(wi)
= zi > 0).
2.2 Welfare

















i are welfare if the individual has condition i and is not treated





7The welfare formulation is quite general and is compatible with utilitar-
ianism, more complicated Bergsonian individualistic welfare functions, and
with extra welfarist (Culyer, 1991) value judgements, including simple health
gain maximisation as in the allocation literature. The only restriction we im-
pose is that welfare for a treated individual is increasing in health gain and
decreasing in the waiting time: sT
ib > 0, sT
iw < 0.
The welfare maximising bene￿t threshold bS
i for consumption of health
care by individuals with income y is de￿ned by
s
T
i (y;b;wi) ￿ s
NT
i (y) ￿ 0 () b ￿ b
S
i (wi;y) (9)
Individuals may choose to consume too much (bS
i > ^ bi) or too little (bS
i < ^ bi)
care. It is not possible to control use directly, so that it is determined by
^ bi(wi;y), not by bS
i (wi;y). But ^ bi(wi;y) and bS
i (wi;y) vary with waiting time,
so that the welfare maximising allocation may be in￿ uenced by the e⁄ect
of waiting time on the discrepancy between welfare maximising and actual
bene￿t thresholds.




i , so that individ-
uals￿decisions on health care consumption are respected in the sense that
^ bi(wi;y) = bS
i (wi;y). Even if it was possible to directly alter the bene￿t
thresholds (and hence demand) at given waiting times, there would be no
welfare gain from doing so.
Policy in health care markets often re￿ ects paternalistic value judgements
which imply that individuals consume too little or too much health care
(Musgrave, 1959; Sandmo, 1983). A common example is the belief that
the use of health care should depend only on ￿need￿ , de￿ned as capacity to
bene￿t from health care b, and not on characteristics such as income. We
can capture this notion, which is closely related to horizontal equity, with a
welfare function in which
s
NT









The welfare maximising treatment threshold de￿ned by (9) is bS
i (wi;y) =
^ bi(wi;yo) which is the same for individuals irrespective of their income level
(and any other characteristics deemed irrelevant in assessing need). yo is
the reference income required to generate the welfare maximising treatment
threshold given the waiting time. Individual decisions on consuming health
care will not be welfare maximising except for those with y = yo. If ^ biy is
negative, expected use will be too high for those with y > yo and too low for
those with y < yo.
The literature on CER allocation rules embodies the extra welfarist value
judgement that the aim of the health care system is to maximise the total
8health gain of the population (Garber 2000; Smith 2005). We could capture
this value judgement by writing welfare as discounted health gain
s
T
i (y;b;wi) = ￿i(wi)b; s
NT
i (y) = 0 (11)
where b is the health gain from health care with no waiting, and ￿i(wi) is a
discount factor satisfying
￿i(wi) 2 (0;1]; ￿i(0) = 1; ri(wi) ￿ ￿￿iw(wi)=￿i(wi) > 0 (12)
with ri being the proportionate rate of decrease of the discount factor.
3 Priority setting between treatments
3.1 Optimal waiting times
Decision makers in the public health care service allocate resources amongst





￿iciDi(wi) ￿ 0 (13)
where ci is the constant average and marginal cost of treatment i, and M
the ￿xed health service budget. Health service decision makers allocate treat-
ment (zi), or equivalently choose waiting times, to maximise the social welfare
function. The cost of meeting all demand generated by zero waiting times
exceeds the budget:
P


























iw(y;b;wi)fi(b;y)dbdy ￿ ￿￿iciDiw ￿ 0;wi ￿ 0 (15)
with complementary slackness, for all i.7
7Although there always exists a vector of waiting times such that the constraint is sat-
is￿ed as a strict inequality, su¢ ciency of the ￿rst order conditions requires restrictions on
the second derivatives of the social welfare function, utility functions and the distribution
functions.
9Increasing wi has two e⁄ects on welfare. First, increasing the waiting
time reduces welfare from treatment. The marginal welfare cost of waiting






iw(y;bi;wi)fidbdy=Di > 0 (16)
Second, there is a welfare loss arising from the patients who decide not
to seek treatment when the waiting time increases. The marginal threshold







i )^ biw(wi;y)fi(^ bi(wi;y);y)dy=Di (17)
sT
i (y ;^ bi(wi;y);wi) ￿sNT
i (y) is the social welfare reduction when the mar-
ginal patient with income y fails to seek treatment. When the waiting time
increases, the bene￿t threshold at which patients seek treatment is increased
(^ biw > 0) and sT
i ￿ sNT
i is forgone.
The marginal patient has zero personal bene￿t from treatment (vT
i (y;
^ bi(wi;y); wi) = vNT
i (y)) so that, if the welfare function respects individ-
ual relative valuations of treatment and no treatment,  i = 0. If all indi-
viduals place too low a value on treatment relative to no treatment then
sT
i (y;^ bi(wi;y);wi) > sNT
i (y) at all income levels and  i > 0. For example,
suppose that we care about need and the social welfare function is given by
(10) and that the reference income is yo
i = ymax. Then all individuals ought
to consume the same expected amount of care as the richest individual. If
vT
iy > vNT
iy , so that the probability of consumption care when ill increases
with income, then all individuals consume too little care and  i > 0. With
a smaller reference income some individuals have too high an expected con-
sumption and some too low, so that it is possible that  i < 0.
We can use (16) and (17) to write (15) as
￿( i + ￿i) ￿ ￿ci"iww
￿1
i ￿ 0; wi ￿ 0 (18)
where "iw = Diwwi=Di < 0 is the elasticity of demand for treatment i with
respect to the waiting time.
Proposition 1 The optimal allocation has three types of treatment:
(i) treatment i is not provided: wi ￿ wo
i, where Di(wo




￿( i + ￿i) ￿ ￿ci"iww
￿1
i ￿ 0 (19)
10(ii) treatment i is an emergency treatment: wi = 0, and
lim
wi!0￿( i + ￿i) ￿ ￿ci"iww
￿1
i ￿ 0 (20)




￿i +  i
"iw (21)
The optimal waiting time for elective care is higher the greater the cost
of treatment and lower the greater the marginal cost of waiting (￿i) and
the marginal threshold welfare cost ( i) from patients displaced by higher
waiting times.
Waiting time should be higher if demand is more elastic with respect to
waiting time. A given reduction in provision will generate a smaller increase
in waiting time the more elastic the demand. Waiting time is a deadweight
loss: none of additional cost to consumers of having to wait longer accrues
as a gain to anyone else (by contrast user charges paid by patients accrue to
funders). Hence we should be more willing to reduce supply for treatments
with more elastic demands.
3.2 Allocation in terms of cost e⁄ectiveness ratios
Suppose that welfare from treatment is additively separable in income and
multiplicatively separable in the bene￿t and waiting time as:
s
T
i (y;b;wi) = ~ s
T
i (y) + ￿i(w)b (22)









where ri(wi) = ￿￿iw(wi)=￿i(wi) is the proportionate rate of decline in the
discount factor ￿i and Bi(wi) is the undiscounted health gain per treated
patient. Note that Bi depends on the wait because wi a⁄ects the number of
patients being treated through ^ bi.










^ biwfi(^ bi(y;wi))dy=Di (24)
11When ~ sT
i (y) = sNT
i (y), the marginal threshold cost is positive because the
welfare function takes account only of discounted health gains from treatment
and ignores the factors which in￿ uence patient decisions on whether to seek
treatment.
An increase in expenditure on treatment of £1 increases supply of the
treatment by 1=ci. A unit increase in supply reduces the waiting time by
1=￿iDiw. A unit reduction in waiting time reduces waiting time costs at the
rate ￿i￿iDi = ri￿iBi￿iDi and welfare arising from additional patients treated
increases at the rate  i￿iDi. Thus, when the welfare function has (22), the

















Note that the marginal value of expenditure depends on the bene￿t-cost ratio
Bi=ci which is the inverse of the CER.
We can restate the conditions describing an optimal allocation of the
budget across treatments in terms of the marginal value of expenditure on
treatment i (25) and the shadow value of the budget constraint (￿):
Proposition 2 If welfare from treatment is additive separable in income and
multiplicatively separable in waiting time and bene￿t then at the optimal al-
location
















i is the waiting time at which demand is zero (Di(0) = 0)

























A pure CER rule would provide treatment i if and only if Bi(0)=ci ex-
ceeded the shadow marginal value of the health sector budget ￿. Although
the optimal allocation depends on the cost-e⁄ectiveness ratios for di⁄erent
12treatments, the CER based rule of allocating resources in reverse order of cost
e⁄ectiveness is not optimal. Since patients are not drawn at random from the
pool of potential patients the undiscounted health bene￿t per treated patient
(Bi(wi)) declines with the number of patients treated. Thus the CER for a
treatment is determined by the allocation decision rather than determining
it.
Suppose that all patients would have the same bene￿t bi from a treatment,
so that undiscounted health gain per treated patient Bi = bi is constant and
does not depend on the amount of treatment i. Suppose that vT
i = uT
i (y)
+￿i(wi)bi ￿ai where ai is an access cost of getting treatment. If there
exists an income ^ yi 2 (ymin ymax) such that vT
i (^ yi;bi;wi) = vNT
i (^ yi) and if vT
iy
￿vNT
iy is positive, then demand for treatment i is decreasing in the waiting
time. Then even when the constant bi replaces Bi(wi) in Proposition 2, the
decision to provide treatments is not based solely on their bene￿t cost ratios.
Although a higher bene￿t cost ratio makes it more likely that a treatment
will be provided it is also necessary to take account of the responsiveness of
demand to waiting time, the marginal threshold welfare loss and the rate at
which discounted health bene￿ts decline with the waiting time. A higher
discount rate ri makes it more likely that a treatment will be supplied since
the cost of smaller supply (implying a longer wait) are greater. A higher
threshold cost for patients displaced by a smaller supply will also increase
supply. Finally, the more responsive demand is to waiting time the smaller
will be the supply and the higher the waiting time.
3.3 User charges
The assumption that user charges were zero was made to simplify the ex-
position and notation. Allowing for positive ￿xed user charges makes very
little di⁄erence. Thus suppose that treatment i carries a charge of pi < ci.
Then the threshold bene￿t level is ^ bi(y;pi;wi) determined by vT
i (y￿pi;b;wi)
= vNT
i (y) and the demand functions also depend on the charge Di(wi;pi).
After inserting ^ bi(y;pi;wi) and Di(wi;pi) in the welfare function (8) and the
budget constraint (13), the resulting ￿rst order conditions di⁄er only in hav-
ing ci ￿ pi replace ci. The only change to Proposition 1 required is that
production cost ci is replaced with the net ￿nancial cost ci ￿pi to the public
sector the net ￿nancial cost to the public sector.
With the social welfare function satisfying (22), the value of an additional














13where ￿i = pi=ci is the copayment rate: the proportion of the unit cost of
treatment recovered by a charge to the patient. Proposition 2 now holds
with (29) replacing (25). A treatment is more likely to be provided, or have
a larger supply, if it has a higher exogenous copayment rate.
4 Public sector allocation in the presence of
a private sector
In many countries with public health care systems patients also have the op-
tion of buying treatment from private sector providers. We now show that
the existance of the private sector a⁄ects the form of the demand functions
for public care but does not alter our main conclusions about the factors de-
termining the optimal allocation of resources across treatments in the public
sector.
Individuals with condition i can obtain private sector treatment with no
wait at price of mi or public sector treatment at no charge but after a wait of
wi. We assume that utility is separable in income and health, and concave in
income, to simplify the derivation of the results, though they do not depend
on the assumption.
Public treatment yields utility vGT
i = vT
i (y;b;wi) = ￿(y) + ui(b;wi) ￿ ai.
Utility from private treatment is vPT
i = vT
i (y￿mi;b;0) = ￿(y￿mi)+ui(b;0)￿
ai. We assume that marginal utility from health gain is higher if the wait is
smaller. Utility from no treatment is vNT
i (y) = ￿(y).
Patients prefer public to no treatment if vGT
i > vNT
i . The bene￿t thresh-
old above which patients prefer public treatment to no treatment is ^ bGN
i (wi),
de￿ned by ui(b;wi) ￿ ai = 0.
Patients prefer public to private treatment if vGT
i (y;b;wi) > vPT
i (y ￿
mi;b;0). bGP
i (y;wi;mi) is the bene￿t threshold below which patients prefer
public treatment to private treatment. It is decreasing in waiting time and
income.
Patients prefer private to no treatment if vT
i (y ￿ mi;b;0) > vNT
i (y). The
bene￿t threshold above which patients prefer private treatment to no treat-
ment is bPN
i (y;mi). The threshold is decreasing in income.
Figure 1 shows the choices of di⁄erent types of patients. The locus where
patients are indi⁄erent between private and public treatment (bGP
i ) and the
locus where they are indi⁄erent between private and no treatment (bPN
i ) are
downward sloping in (b;y) space. The locus where they are indi⁄erent be-
tween public treatment and no treatment (^ bGN
i ) is horizontal since it depends
only on the public sector waiting time. Patients who are indi⁄erent between
14public and private treatment and indi⁄erent between public and no treat-
ment, must also be indi⁄erent between private and no treatment. Hence
bGP
i and bPN
i intersect on ^ bGN




Patients with high bene￿t and low income demand public treatment. Pa-
tients with high bene￿t and high income demand private treatment. Patients
with low bene￿t demand no treatment.










i (y;wi) = max[min[bGP
i ;bmax];^ bGN
i ].

















dy < 0 (31)
When waiting time increases some public sector patients decide not to be
treated (￿rst term in (31)) and some patients opt for the private sector (sec-
ond term in (31)). In terms of Figure 1, an increase in wi shifts the locus ^ bGN
i
upward and so patients along the locus who have incomes y 2 [ymin;yGN
i ]
switch out of the public sector and are not treated. The increase in wi
also shifts the locus bGP
i downward. Hence patients along the locus with
yi 2 [yGP
i ;yGN
i ] decide to switch from the public into the private sector.
Total welfare is the sum of the utility of public patients, private patients







































i (y;wi) = max[min[bGP
i ;bmax];bPN
i ] and ^ bN
i (y;wi) = min[^ bGN
i ;bPN
i ].
An increase in waiting time has no e⁄ect on the inframarginal untreated
patients or private patients. It reduces the utility of the public patients
directly and also changes the thresholds at which people choose public treat-
ment rather than private treatment or no treatment. Although the marginal
patients are indi⁄erent, there will be a welfare gain or loss associated with
the change in the number of patients treated in the public sector unless the
social welfare function respects the patient decisions.
The marginal social value of an increase in waiting time for treatment i
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PT


















iw (y;b;wi)fi(b;y)dbdy ￿ ￿ci￿iDiw (35)
The ￿rst term is the e⁄ect on welfare via the displacement of patients who
are forced out of the public sector and who do not get treated. The second
is the e⁄ect via the displacement of patients from the public into to private
sector. Dividing (35) through by the number of treated patients (￿iDi) we

















i are the marginal threshold costs for patients pushed out of
the public sector into no treatment or into the private sector.
 
GP
i likely to be zero even with an extra welfarist welfare function since
the marginal individual is merely shifting between consumption of private
and public health care. Thus the form of the rules for allocating a given
public health care sector across treatments are una⁄ected by the existance
of a private sector alternative to public care.
165 Conclusions
We have investigated the optimal allocation of a ￿xed health care budget
across treatments when there is rationing by waiting and user charges are
exogenous. Our main ￿nding is that the optimal waiting time is higher for
treatments with demands which are more elastic to waiting time, higher costs,
lower charges, and smaller marginal disutility from waiting. In addition, if
the welfare function does not respect patient choices between treatment and
no treatment, the waiting time should be lower for treatments where under-
consumption of health care has a greater welfare cost.
The general message is that optimal allocation across sectors must take
account of way care is rationed within sectors. Hence, allocation rules based
purely on cost e⁄ectiveness ratios are suboptimal because they assume that
there is no rationing within treatments.
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